I. Introduction
Entering the 21 st century, the Chinese government has called for building a -Harmonious Society,‖ under a new -scientific‖ development paradigm that emphasizes more balanced, sustainable growth, with development that will -put people first‖.  Putting China on a timetable to achieve -xiaokang society‖ (well off society).
Following the National People's Congress, the change in discourse has been striking.
From government ministries to think tanks in Beijing, the talk is of a -scientific concept of development‖ that will be -people-centered‖ (yiren weiben), that rejects a narrow focus on GDP growth to emphasize social development, as well as a balanced, more inclusive growth. Premier Wen Jiabao, in particular, has called for redressing the current 1 Traditionally, the Premier appears at the annual National People's Congress meetings in March to present a report on the work of the government. This report reviews the achievements of the past year and outlines the main undertakings for the coming year. This report is the occasion for presenting major new policies and changes in direction.
inequalities by -tilting‖ toward the rural sector through promulgating policies that offer more favorable treatment of the -three agricultures‖-agricultural production, rural villages, and farmers. In support of these policies, he instructed the Ministry of Finance to come up with a plan to -extend public finance to the rural villages,‖ to improve the delivery of public services to the rural sector. These preferences were built into the eleventh five year plan (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , which formally adopted the -strategic concepts of ‗Scientific Approach to Development‖ and "Constructing a Harmonious Socialist
Society."
This is a timely, long overdue adjustment of the development path China has taken since beginning its remarkable transition to a market economy some 25 years ago. This paper addresses the new turn in China's paradigm and assesses its prospects, focusing especially on whether the government will be able to reverse the trend of growing inequality and improving rural public services. This assessment will be done through the lens of fiscal policies, the primary instrument for the government in implementing the new paradigm.
II. The "old" paradigm and the impetus for change
It would be unfair to characterize the -old‖ paradigm (circa 1978-2000) -the one intended to be replaced, as the -blind pursuit of GDP growth‖ implied by the People's However, it is undeniable that achieving economic growth was assigned top priority through the past two decades. The most concrete manifestation of this was the enshrinement of GDP growth at the top of performance indicators used in the cadre evaluation system at all levels of the administrative hierarchy (Whiting 2003) . The old paradigm also tolerated a higher degree of inequality under the call of Deng Xiaoping, its chief architect, at the outset of reform to -let some people (regions) get rich first.‖ The logic behind the call appeared to be that, if market reform brought with it rising inequality, it was the price to pay for faster growth, to lift the country out of the abject poverty that Maoist policies had brought.
Achievements of China's liberalization and market transition are spectacular and wellknown. 3 Since 1978, China has experienced a prolonged growth spurt that saw an eightfold increase in per capita GDP -a record unparalleled in world economic history.
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What has been even more remarkable was the extraordinary rate at which China has joined the global economy. Starting out as an autarkic economy largely insulated from world trade, Chinese exports doubled every three years. Bank (1997) . 4 In recent world economic history, Japan and South Korea underwent growth spurts of similar magnitudes, but China has maintained the growth spurt for longer duration and at higher rates.
made it an -engine of growth‖ increasingly courted by world leaders. By IMF estimates, China accounted for nearly one-quarter of world economic growth in 2004, a remarkable feat given that the Chinese economy remains small compared to the major countries -it is just one-eight the size of the US economy and less than 5 percent of the world GNP (World Development Report 2004) .
Fueling this performance was the rapid structural transformation of the economy -some 25 percent of China's labor force moved from low productivity agricultural sector jobs to higher productivity jobs in the industrial and service sectors. As productivity rose acrossthe-board, as many as 400 million people were lifted above the official poverty line, making this the most successful poverty alleviation program in world history.
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Time for a course correction
Given these spectacular successes, it might have seemed surprising for the new, at that time untested administration of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao to call for a significant change in development strategy. The reasons are several-fold. First, while achieving this economic miracle, China also acquired a reputation as a country that has abandoned its socialist past and embraced a particularly virulent form of capitalism. The evidence includes a rapid rise in interpersonal income inequalities as measured by Gini coefficients, which rose from an estimated 0.28 in 1978 to 0.45 at the end of the 20 th Century -a level that puts China in the same league as Latin American economies, and far worse than its East Asian neighbors. 6 A major cause is an urban-rural income gap that is among the biggest in the world. Having grown secularly since the mid-1980s, the ratio of average urban to rural income is now estimated to be more than three. The ever-growing divide between coastal and inland provinces also contributes to making China among the most unequal countries in the world. These large disparities are aggravated by the hukou system, a system of residency controls retained from the Maoist era, which imposes a 
III. Fiscal policies: China's decentralized system and the growth of inequalities in the 1980s and 1990s
To understand the central role played by the intergovernment fiscal system in shaping distributional outcomes in China, we start with some stylized facts. First, China is the most decentralized country in the world by expenditure shares: the central government accounts for only 30 percent of total budgetary expenditures. The rest are distributed across the four levels of local government (see Annex A for the structure of government).
Some comparative data are presented in Table 1 to show China to be far more decentralized than other countries. Table 2 shows that China is also unusual in assigning many responsibilities to the lower levels of government, below the province. Insur.
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In this paper, unless otherwise stated (e.g. in Table 2 ), -local‖ government is used inter-changeably with -subnational‖ government, and refers to government at the provincial, municipal, county, and township levels.
Source: adapted from Mountfield and Wong (2005) , Table 2 . Key: 1 = responsibility; 2 = provision; F = federal/national; S = state/province; L = local; C = concurrent
China is virtually unique in assigning pension pooling, social welfare and unemployment insurance to local governments. In other countries, because of their ballooning costs and potentially large requirements for fiscal subsidies, social security is almost always provided by the central (or federal) government, except in a few former Soviet republics.10 Safety net mechanisms are almost always jointly financed by the national government because these large, cyclical expenditures are difficult for local budgets to accommodate especially as they run counter to economic cycles (i.e. with expenditures rising during economic downturns, when tax receipts are falling). Responsibilities for basic education and public health are similarly often shared with the provincial and central governments because of their costliness, important spillover effects, and concerns for maintaining minimum standards of provision. 10 In the early 1990s in Brazil the states and municipalities were allowed to opt out of the national social security scheme, and many established their own scheme. The poor design and management of these local schemes have led to the creation of contingent liabilities on local governments that amount to as much as 500 percent of GDP. Yvonne Sin presentation at the World Bank, March 17, 2005. These unusual expenditure assignments in China are the unreformed legacies from the planned economy. During the 1950s-1970s, in China the central government was responsible for national defense, economic development (capital spending, R&D, industrial policy, universities and research institutes), and administration of national institutions such as the judicial system. Local governments had responsibilities for delivering day-to-day public administration and social services such as education (except universities), public safety, health care, housing, and other local/urban services. Social security (pensions) was mostly the responsibility of state-owned enterprises.11 These assignments were unproblematic because they were financed by the central budget through revenue-sharing arrangements.
Decentralization by default rather than design
Through the twenty-five years of transition to a market economy, the expenditure assignment rules have remained largely intact, while expenditure shares have shifted significantly to local governments. The rules remain that local governments are mainly responsible for public administration and -local social needs‖, while the central government focuses on issues of national scope. However, several changes occurred to raise the local share of expenditures:12
11 Unemployment was not recognized as a problem and no provision was made for it. 12 See Wong (1991) for a discussion of these effects on increasing local government fiscal burdens, most of which had occurred during the 1980s.
Under the planned economy, a large portion of central spending went to capital investments and providing financing for state-owned enterprises. By the mid-1980s, the financing for state-owned enterprises had been transferred from the budget to the banking system, as were the bulk of capital investments. These reduced central spending relatively.
Responsibilities for capital investments in support of local economic development were decentralized to local governments.
Social expenditures that had been borne by state-owned enterprises -including housing, pensions, education and health care, were gradually transferred to local governments.
Retrenchment in the state-owned enterprise sector led safety net expenditures to rise rapidly -unemployment stipends, early retirements and increased pension payouts.
Rapid wage increases during the transition have raised the cost of labor-intensive services such as public administration, education, health and other social services, affecting disproportionately local expenditures.
Local government expenditures also rose with the rising standards of provision for education, health care, etc., due to national policy as well as popular demand.
Urbanization, increased mobility of population, and the growing diversity of economic entities brought increased costs of infrastructural and other urban services including public safety, judicial and procuratorial services, most of which are local responsibilities.
Even without a revision of functional assignments, these changes combined to raise the local share of total budgetary expenditures from 45 percent in 1980 to 70 percent by the 1990s. In the meantime, though, revenue-sharing rules were being changed repeatedly by the central government in response to macroeconomic pressures and attempts to stimulate revenue mobilization, and the link between local revenues and expenditure needs was weakened and then severed. As a result, local governments were shifted from performing deconcentrated functions of the central government to financing these functions.
Changes in revenue sharing rules
Under the planned economy, all revenues belonged to the central government, but were collected by local governments and remitted upward. Revenue sharing with local governments was ex post, negotiated annually, and adjusted to finance local government functions. Market reforms brought a rapid and dramatic erosion in the traditional tax base of the planned economy -state-owned enterprise profits, and revenue collection declined steeply. Central revenues were especially hard-hit as local governments in rich regions often shielded local enterprises from taxation to avoid sharing revenues with central government.13 The results can be seen in Figure A , where budget revenues fell from more than 30 percent of GDP to less than 15 percent during 1978 -1993. At the same time, the central government's share of revenues was also declining as revenue assignments adjusted to the rising expenditure needs at the local levels. 13 For example, under the planned economy Shanghai remitted more than 80 percent of its revenues to the central government. This high -tax‖ on Shanghai revenues created incentives for collusion between the municipal government and its subordinate enterprises and the potential for informally sharing the -saved revenues‖ within Shanghai. For analyses of this evolution, see Oksenberg and Tong (1991 ), and Wong (1991 , 1992 . This desperate situation spurred a drastic reform: introduction of the Tax Sharing System (TSS) in 1994. The TSS fundamentally overhauled the revenue sharing system by shifting to tax assignments, under which taxes were assigned to central government, local government, or shared. By assigning the biggest tax, the value-added tax (VAT), as a shared tax and claiming 75 percent of its receipts, the central government reclaimed a majority portion of total revenues.15
The broken intergovernmental system and the growth of inequalities 14 This was largely because the contracts had failed to anticipate the high inflation rates through the late 1980s and early 1990s, when revenues grew at an annual rate of 12 percent from 1987 to 1993 while remittances grew at low single digit rates. 15 The VAT accounts for nearly half of all tax revenues in China. It is also a reliable tax whose revenues go up with GDP regardless of profitability, and thus less cyclical than income or profit taxes.
The Tax Sharing System had made the system much more favorable to rich localities.
First, by sharing VAT revenue with local governments at a uniform rate by origin, the TSS is inherently disequalizing. This disequalizing character of the system was exacerbated by the new system of transfers, which was dominated by tax rebates that also favor the rich ( Figure C) .16 Through the 1980s and 1990s, the coherence of the intergovernmental fiscal system was steadily chipped away by the piecemeal, incremental changes that occurred. While the Soviet-type system that was in use had been conducive neither to efficiency nor growth, it had built-in mechanisms for adjusting revenues assignments and transfers to expenditure needs. During the 1980s, amidst the steep fiscal decline, attention was focused on how to resuscitate revenue collection. Reforms on the intergovernmental system were designed to stimulate tax effort by local governments, and virtually no attention was paid to issues of expenditure assignments. Equally little attention was paid to transfers, which were increasingly driven by dwindling central resources (Wong 1997) . 16 As a concession to gain support for the TSS from the coastal provinces, the government committed to returning to provinces a portion of the -growth‖ in VAT and excise taxes, also by origin, in tax rebates. Tax rebates accounted for three-quarters of central transfers to the provinces in the mid-1990s, while equalization transfers were only 1-2 percent (World Bank 2002).
By changing only one component of the intergovernmental system -revenue assignments, and delinking them from expenditure needs, the reforms have left local governments saddled with unusually heavy and unsustainable expenditure assignments, especially at low levels of government.
By the mid-1990s, local governments were self-financed, with no supporting system of transfers to ensure minimum standards of service provision across regions. As economic growth also became more concentrated in coastal regions during the 1990s, income disparities accelerated, and the fiscal system provided no palliative. The outcome was a sharp rise in interregional disparities in fiscal spending - Table 3 shows a significant worsening of the distribution in both economic and fiscal resources through the 1990s. (UNDP 2005) . Aside from the differences in income, this reflects the lower life expectancy in rural areas, which, at 69.6, was 5.6 years less than in urban areas. It also reflects the differences in levels of education: the share of population between 15 to 64 years of age without any formal education was 8.7 percent in rural areas -more than three times the urban rate (Census 2000).
In an important sense, then, the intergovernmental fiscal system was broken:
implementation of decisions made at the top could not be assured at the lower levels given the existing financial arrangements (Wong 1997 (Wong , 2007a . Noncompliance by local governments became a bottleneck to national policy implementation (World Bank 2002) .
IV. The challenge of reversing the inequalities
Attempts to improve equalization had in fact begun under the Zhu Rongji administration.
Since around 1998, a number of new programs have been introduced that had the effect of -tilting‖ toward the poorer regions. This began with the fiscal stimulus program introduced in 1998 to counter the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis with deficit spending. The program injected 100 billion yuan into capital spending, mostly on infrastructural investments, and the decision was taken to -tilt‖ them toward promoting economic growth in inland provinces.
In aggregate terms, central transfers to local governments more than tripled, from 328.5 billion yuan in 1998 to more than one trillion yuan in 2004, during a period of virtually zero inflation. As shown in Table 4 , this was achieved by the central government devoting three-quarters of its budgetary revenues growth during the period to transfers.
In the process, it raised the share of its revenues devoted to transfers from two-thirds to nearly three-quarters. Moreover, nearly three-quarters of this growth in transfers was outside of tax rebates -i.e., devoted to equalization purposes. Since the TSS had recentralized revenues but left expenditure assignments unchanged, 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4
Total transfers
Transfers net of tax rebates * defined as transfers divided by local expenditures. Source: calculated from Budget speeches to the NPC, Lou (2000), Wong (1997) , and Li and Xu (2006) .
Data presented in Table 5 shows that fiscal disparities remained very large across provinces in 2004 despite the valiant effort of the past six years. Per capita budgetary expenditures (own revenues + transfers) were 7875 yuan in Shanghai, the richest provincial level unit, and just 899 yuan in Henan, the province with the lowest fiscal capacity. The range of 8.8 to 1 from the richest to the poorest is large by international standards. These inter-provincial disparities were aggravated by the TSS reform in 1994.
The disparities appear to have moderated somewhat since then, but the coefficient of variation has remained at 0.75 since 1998, indicating that fiscal disparities remain stubbornly large across provinces. Given that very large differences remain, the size of the equalization effort required is huge. Another picture of the difficulty is offered in Figure F G u iz h o u G a n s u Y u n n a n G u a n g x i S h a a n x i A n h u i
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V. Redoubling the effort: the Harmonious Society Program
As noted at the outset of this paper, the main thrust of the changes introduced under the administration of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao is to increase redistribution and effect a rebalancing of the economy, aimed at reversing some of the inequalities that have emerged, addressing social grievances and relieving tensions. Accordingly, the 11th Five Year Plan document has laid out broad objectives that include:
Reducing inequalities across sectors and regions
Strengthening the social safety net Improving public services, including environmental protection Strengthening the rule of law, etc.
Many new programs have been rolled out that have a clear pro-poor, pro-rural thrust. For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of this paper I will refer to these broadly as the -Harmonious Society Program‖ (HSP). Aside from the rural fee reform, they include free rural basic education, new cooperative medical insurance for farmers, building the -new Socialist Countryside,‖ rural dibao (minimum living stipend), training and job placement support for rural out-migration, and social security schemes for farmers. Table   6 offers some details of the programs. Government provides funding to replace revenues from the textbook and miscellaneous fees and provides a subsidy to boarding students from "poor" families.
Free Rural Compulsory Education
2006-2007
To take on nine years of compulsory education financed by public resources; to reduce financial costs to families in order to expand access.
Government provides funding to replace revenues from "miscellaneous fees" (zafei) at an average of RMB140 per student p.a. for all rural primary school students, and RMB180 per student p.a. for all rural junior middle school students. By 2007 this will cover 150 million students. Under China's highly decentralized systems of fiscal management and administration, the central government employs extensive delegation of authorities in a nested, hierarchical setting. The central government delegates authorities to the provinces, and depends on the provinces to carry out their responsibilities. The provinces in turn delegate to the municipalities, and depend on them to ‗deliver' on their assigned responsibilities, and so on downward through the hierarchy ( Figure F ). This decentralized administration can be an asset for cost-effective service delivery, if local governments can be held accountable for performance. At present, though, the accountability relationships are weak on multiple levels, with the result that compliance with central policies is not always assured at the local levels, and central transfers are not always used as intended. 20 In a paper written in 2007, I proposed a -start-up Harmonious Society Program‖ that substantially increases central funding for the five programs underway, on rural education, rural health, rural dibao, etc., at a cost of RMB 205 billion, an amount that was equal to 12 percent of central revenues in 2005, and less than the amount of -unbudgeted‖ revenue increase that year (Wong 2007b ).
Figure F. Hierarchical delegation in China
Central government  provinces Provincial government  Municipalities Municipalities  Counties Counties  Townships Townships  villages/farmers Likewise contributing to the often low effectiveness of public expenditures is the weak accountability relationship between service providers -which are mostly public institutions -and local governments. Just as the central government has few levers to enforce compliance by local governments, local governments often lack effective levers over service providers. Finally, the downward accountability of both service providers and local governments to citizens is also weak, and most services are provided without significant participation by citizens or communities.
These are in part legacies of the long fiscal decline, during which incremental reforms had focused narrowly on reviving revenue collection, especially central revenues. In the process revenue and expenditure assignments were de-linked, and the withering away of transfers led ultimately to a breakdown of the intergovernmental fiscal system. Despite significantly increased transfers and improved equalization since 1998, underfunding remains a fundamental obstacle to the central-local accountability relationship today, as the intergovernmental fiscal system still does not ensure sufficient funding to counties and townships in the western and central provinces (World Bank 2007a) . This is true for overall amounts as well as for specific programs, since the system still lacks mechanisms for ensuring that mandated services can be financed in poor counties. Moreover, the assignment of responsibilities across local governments is murky -with many programs requiring joint financing among the many levels but no clear divisions, and local governments do not have clearly articulated roles and functions against which they can be held accountable.
The accountability relationship with public service providers is similarly undermined by underfunding, as many of them are not adequately funded for their public service tasks.
Instead, these providers are often expected to cross-subsidize their public service from money-making activities (World Bank 2005) .
Weak accountability also stems from the weak information base for policy analysis in China, especially for rural public services, which undermines efforts to judge the performance of local governments and service providers. Even though a huge amount of information is routinely reported, China lacks a system for vetting and reconciling the data reported by the different ministries and agencies, and their figures can vary widely. In sum, piecemeal reforms to the system of public finance over the past 25 years have repaired the revenue mechanism, but left expenditure management in substantial disarray.
As a result, the central government faces significant difficulties in implementing social policies through the present system of delegated governance.
VI. Conclusion
In Wong (2007a) I had argued that rural interests tend to be left out in the competition for central transfers, so that Wen Jiabao's pro-rural policies will have an uphill struggle to get sufficient funding. In this paper I have reviewed the new Harmonious Society policies being implemented, focusing not only on funding levels, but also policy implementation mechanisms to argue that because the government has delayed institutional reform in the public sector, the central government's capacity to achieve stated social objectives is weak. Under the current intergovernmental arrangements, on average, local governments do not have the wherewithal to implement the HSP, nor do they have unambiguous incentives for doing so. Under these circumstances, even though the central government has the will and the ability to provide funds, it will find it difficult to channel them toward delivering services at the grassroots levels of Chinese society.
This inability of the central government to implement policies in support of the national vision of a Harmonious Society points to a fundamental weakness in the foundation on which China is building its hopes for the 21st Century.
More worrisome is that the gap between government promises and its capacity to deliver is very large and growing rapidly on the many components of the Harmonious Society
Program -on the environment, on health care and education reforms, and on -tilting‖ toward the ethnic minority regions, etc. On every front, there are daunting institutional challenges. On the environment, the government will have to undertake large realignment of relative prices and significantly raise tax rates on energy resources, as well as tackle the issues such as giant SOEs such as Sinopec, CNOOC, power companies capturing huge economic rents that keep resource regions impoverished and production methods backward and inefficient. To improve health care and education, provider incentives will have to be fundamentally altered, etc.
The challenges are great. The government has shown willingness to acknowledge problems and seek solutions. The current piecemeal approaches, however, will unlikely suffice, especially since the central leadership remains stuck in the mindset that it can mandate policy changes, and spends too little effort building public support for its programs. The ratcheting up of promises by top leaders in the past 2-3 years carries significant political risks, since they are building expectations that the machinery of government may not have the capacity to deliver.
